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INTRODUCTION 
Directors of “for profit” and “nonprofit” health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs), like all corporate directors, are subject to the duty of care in their oversight 
of the business.  This duty extends over business performance as well as compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations.  Within the scope of this duty is the 
responsibility for attentive oversight of the corporation’s information systems. 
Directors may be held personally liable for business losses stemming from the 
failure to meet their duty of care.  Most states apply the gross negligence standard 
when evaluating directors’ conduct.  This standard reflects the statutory and judicial 
views that corporate goals, and those of the nation’s economy, are best served by a 
degree of risk-taking that may be greater than that of the prudent person.  Only 
where directors’ actions are based in self-dealing, fraud or are found to be wholly 
lacking in good faith will courts find conduct which constitutes gross negligence. 
The art and science of managed care for the majority of health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) is wholly dependent on the plan’s automated information 
systems.  HMOs are distinctive for the volume, variability and volatility of the data 
on which they rely to conduct business.  This degree of reliance makes effective 
information systems a fundamental prerequisite for the HMO’s success.  Indeed, 
“[c]ompetition, employer concerns over costs, and government awareness of health 
care budgets are merely bit players in a drama that has information systems 
technology as the central character.”2   
The HMO’s information management task is prodigious.  The major areas of 
information requirements: membership, provider contracts, utilization review and 
                                                                
2Louis Rossiter, The Research Agenda in Managed Care, in MAKING MANAGED 
HEALTHCARE WORK 584 (Peter Boland ed., 1993). 
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claims payment – each in themselves complex – require a seamless integration in 
order to manage care effectively, run a business profitably, and comply with myriad 
external reporting requirements.  It is common for HMOs to utilize multiple 
information systems, running the different business applications, e.g., enrollment and 
billing, claims and authorizations, and utilization review and case management, on 
separate operating software and hardware.3  In this paper, the terms “information 
system” and “systems” are used to refer generally to all of the computer based or 
automated business functions of an organization.  
HMOs and other health insurers are subject to substantial state and federal 
regulatory requirements.  Publicly traded companies must also comply with the rules 
of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the securities exchange markets 
on which the stock is traded.  Violations of these requirements carry the risk of 
substantial fines, exclusion from government entitlement programs, criminal 
sanctions and delisting from the trading exchanges.  Compliance with these 
requirements is heavily dependent on the quality and integrity of the HMO’s 
information systems. 
Information systems have evolved from an expense item to a strategic investment 
in the future of the company.4  Although the health care industry lags others in the 
extent of information systems investment, spending by managed care companies on 
information systems is about 2% of revenues and growing.5  Considering the scale of 
the larger HMOs such as Kaiser Permanente and the combined Blue Cross Blue 
Shield HMOs, the information system investment can be enormous.  Kaiser, for 
example, plans on spending $1.5 billion to upgrade its information systems over the 
next four years.6 
Given this scale of investment, the centrality of information systems to the 
success of an HMO, the obligation of regulatory compliance, plus the attention now 
focused on the year 2000 “millenium bug” problem,7 information systems are clearly 
a major area of concern and oversight by corporate directors.  This paper analyzes 
the role of information systems in HMOs and the nature of the HMO directors’ duty 
of care in monitoring the integrity of the information systems to determine when 
directors may be held personally liable for losses suffered by the corporation when 
the systems collapse. 
                                                                
3Peter R. Kongstvedt, Using Data in Medical Management, in THE MANAGED HEALTH 
CARE HANDBOOK 440 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 3d ed. 1996). 
4Robert Reese, Information Systems Operations and Organizational Structures, in THE 
MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 455, 455 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 3d ed. 1996) 
[hereinafter Reese, Information Systems].  
5Id. 
6Milt Freudenheim, Kaiser HMO, Erring on Costs, Posts $270 Million Loss for ’97, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998 at D1 [hereinafter Freudenheim, Kaiser HMO, Erring on Costs]. 
7The millenium bug problem stems from the wide spread practice in legacy systems of 
coding information systems to recognize a two digit date.  When the year 2000 arrives the 
digits “00” will be interpreted as 1900.  This was expected to result potentially disastrous 
systems failures, but the 2000 transition passed with relatively few computer problems in the 
U.S.  
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Section I addresses in general the nature of the corporate director’s duty of care 
to monitor business performance.  Section II considers the requirements of finding a 
director liable for negligence in failing to meet this duty.  Section III gives an 
overview of the HMO industry’s dependence on information systems. Section IV 
focuses specifically on the recent experience of the Oxford Health Plan.  Section V 
discusses the potential liability of an HMO’s board in light of the events at Oxford 
and applicable legal standards for the director’s duty of care in monitoring.  Section 
VI concludes with observations on the limits to directors’ liability.  
I.  THE NATURE OF DIRECTORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES 
The structure of corporations is governed largely by state law.  “Corporations are 
creatures of state law and it is state law which is the font of corporate directors’ 
powers.”8  Although some states base their corporate laws on the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) and others, such as Delaware and Maryland, 
have their own distinctive corporate codes, all states require that corporations be 
managed under the direction of a board of directors.9   
In broad terms, the board of directors is responsible for the conduct of the 
business.  In a large corporation, typically the day to day management 
responsibilities are delegated to the executive and other senior staff.  This delegation 
does not release the directors from responsibility to oversee the actions of 
management.10 
All corporate boards are accountable to certain groups.  In a publicly owned 
corporation, the directors answer to the shareholders.11  In a mutual benefit 
corporation accountability runs to the members.12  In public benefit or religious 
corporations the state of incorporation, typically in the person of the attorney 
general, speaks for the beneficiaries under the doctrine of parens patriae, and may 
call the corporation’s directors to account.13 
Accountability may take different forms.  A director may be voted out of office 
by shareholders or members if they do not approve of the director’s performance.14 
                                                                
8Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).  
9DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141 (1991 & Supp. 1996); MD CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS 
§ 2-401 (1993 & Supp. 1998).  
10E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised 
Model Act, the Trans-Union Case, and the ALI Project – A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
1483, 1501 (1985) [hereinafter Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule]. 
11Model Bus. Corp. Act §8.03(d) (revised 1997). 
12See, e.g., Rowen v. Le Mars Mutual Ins. Co., 230 N.W.2d 905 (Iowa 1975); Amabile v. 
Lerner, 166 A.2d 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960), aff’d 181 A.2d 520 (1962). 
13COMMITTEE ON NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDEBOOK 
FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 13-14 (George W. Overton ed., 1993) 
[hereinafter GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS]; Deborah DeMott, 
Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 145 (1993). 
14Model Bus. Corp. Act, § 8.08(a) (revised 1997).  See also, LEWIS SOLOMON ET. AL, 
CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 531 (1994).  Voting a director out of office can be an uphill 
battle for shareholders.  Id.  Incumbent directors and management, with access to the corporate 
proxy statement and corporate treasury, have the distinct advantage in any proxy fight.  Id.  As 
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Although a director cannot act on behalf of the corporation as an individual (unless 
the director is also an officer of the corporation) a director may be personally liable 
for failing to carry out her fiduciary duties.  The usual vehicle for finding personal 
liability is a derivative suit, brought by shareholders15 or members16 on behalf of the 
corporation against the directors and officers.  Such cases typically sound in 
negligence, alleging that the directors’ conduct fell short of the duties of loyalty or 
care and as a result the corporation was harmed.  These cases can result in substantial 
damages awards against directors.17  Corporations typically indemnify their directors 
by terms of the corporate bylaws or charters and acquire Directors and Officers 
liability insurance for this purpose.18 
The specific roles and responsibilities of directors are not enumerated in great 
detail in corporation codes, rather the size and nature of the business will influence 
what exactly the board will do.  The role of the director is largely one of monitoring, 
for example reviewing financial statements and other reports, overseeing compliance 
with local, state and federal laws, punctuated by relatively few decisions.  One 
commentator characterizes the balance as ninety percent monitoring and ten percent 
decision-making.19  According to Newton Minow, former member of the Federal 
Commerce Commission and director of Sara Lee, Manpower and Aon, two of the 
most important decisions directors make are selecting a new chief executive officer 
and “figuring out what to do when the place is in trouble.”20  This observation 
appears to overlook the importance of the board’s decision about how to evaluate the 
CEO.  The choice of evaluation criteria, for example, long term versus short term 
results, may affect whether the corporation gets into trouble in the first place. The 
board will be involved in both the beginning and ending of any major corporate 
initiative, such as an acquisition or divestiture21 as well as any “material transactions 
affecting the assets of the enterprise.”22 
While the specific activities of directors may vary greatly based on the business, 
all boards share certain responsibilities.  Directors are fiduciaries.  The qualities of 
fiduciary duty have brought forth stirring descriptions in legal opinions in keeping 
                                                          
a practical matter, “most public corporations are firmly controlled by self-perpetuating boards 
of directors or by the senior corporate officers that those boards ostensibly have elected.”  Id. 
15Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.40 (1997). 
16O’Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398, 404 (1994). 
17See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (which ultimately resulted in 
multimillion dollar settlement awards against individual directors). 
18William Knepper, An Overview of D&O Liability for Insurance Company Directors and 
Officers, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 63, 67-68 (1978) [hereinafter Knepper, An Overview of D&O 
Liability]; Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.50 (1997). 
19Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention: 
Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1492-95 (1984) [hereinafter Manning, Time for Reality]. 
20John A. Byrne et al., The Best and Worst Boards, BUS. WK., Dec. 8, 1997, at 92.  
21GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 13, at 7.  
22COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE 
DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (Rev. ed., 1978) reprinted in 33 BUS. LAWYER 1591-1644, 1607 
(1978) [hereinafter CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK]. 
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with the weight of obligation the fiduciary shoulders.  “Many forms of conduct 
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to 
those bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals 
of the marketplace.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”23 
Implicit in the obligations of the fiduciary are the twin duties of loyalty and 
care.24  These standards, derived from over a century of litigation, apply equally to 
business and nonprofit corporations.25  The duty of loyalty requires the director to 
put the interests of the corporation first and her own interests last.  The duty of care, 
the focus of this article, speaks to how a director carries out her job.  Defining the 
duty of care with precision has proven a challenge to commentators, judges and 
regulators.  The RMBCA adopts general standards for a director’s performance:  to 
act in good faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
exercise, and in a manner reasonably expected to be in the best interests of the 
corporation.26  The official comment to the RMBCA notes that the elements and 
circumstances of the director’s duty of care, referenced as an element of the business 
judgment rule, “are continuing to be developed by the courts.”27 
A.  Duty of Care  
In spite of the general terms of the RMBCA and the equally general, though 
differently phrased, terms of various state regulations,28 some clarity can be found in 
decisions and commentary about the duty of care.  “[T]he heart of the director’s true 
responsibility is attention to his ongoing multiple functions.”29  For example, 
directors are expected to have a basic knowledge of the business; to read the 
materials provided them; and to inquire for adequate information prior to rendering a 
decision.  Directors are entitled to trust the information given them by responsible 
persons in the corporation but only so long as the director has reason to trust, and no 
reason not to trust, the information. 
“As a general rule, a director should acquire at least a rudimentary understanding 
of the business of the corporation.  Accordingly, a director should become familiar 
with the fundamentals of the business in which the corporation is engaged.”30  
Professor Manning contends that the board has an inherent responsibility to ensure 
the structural integrity of the corporation.  This means the board is responsible for 
                                                                
23Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
24CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 22, at 1599-1600.  
25GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 13, at 21. 
26Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30 (1997). 
27Official Comment, Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30 (revised 1997). 
28A number of states have adopted the RMBCA standard of the ordinarily prudent person 
in a like position under similar circumstances.  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1997); 
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS’NS § 2-405.1 (1993 & Supp.1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
156B, § 65 (1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 6-14 (West 1997); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 512 
(West 1998). 
29Manning, Time for Reality, supra note 19, at 1492-95 (1984). 
30Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821-22 (N.J. 1981).  
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seeing that there is a functioning management structure and an internal information 
system, generally suitable to the company’s character to keep management informed 
and to provide accurate accounting data upon which to base financial statements.31  
Meeting  this responsibility requires a sufficient understanding of the nature of the 
business to know whether the management or information structures in place are 
adequate to their respective tasks.  
The process by which a director informs herself will vary under the specific 
circumstances of the matter at hand, but every director must take steps to inform 
herself of the relevant background and circumstances before taking action.32  First 
among the logical steps is to read the materials provided to the board.  “Needless to 
say, the director should read the information with which he or she is supplied.”33  
Given the board’s responsibility for the financial health of the corporation, directors 
should be familiar with the financial status of the corporation.34  The commentary to 
the Model Act reinforces this obligation, by limiting the director’s reliance to 
information of which they have first hand knowledge.  If the director has not read, or 
heard in oral presentation, or otherwise taken steps to become familiar with certain 
information, she cannot later protect herself by claiming reliance.35 
B.  Reliance 
A director may place reasonable reliance on information, reports and statements 
prepared by officers or employees of the corporation, professional advisors and 
consultants, and committees of the board, provided she has a reasonable basis for 
doing so.36  Similarly, where duties have been delegated to management, directors 
may rely on “the presumption of regularity, absent knowledge or notice to the 
contrary.”37  A director must reasonably believe that the persons presenting 
information merit her confidence.38  A director who accepts or relies on information 
when she has knowledge which would make reliance unreasonable may be liable for 
any action taken on the basis of the unreliable information; this situation could arise, 
for example, if the director had knowledge that a report was based on faulty or 
incomplete information.  
C.  Duty of Inquiry 
The reliance protection has limits, however, and there comes a point at which a 
director is obligated to inquire further.  Precisely where that point lies is the subject 
                                                                
31Manning, Time for Reality, supra note 19, at 1499 (emphasis added). 
32Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 10, at 1495. 
33GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 13, at 23; 
CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, supra note 22, at 1602. 
34Francis, supa note 30, at 821-22.  
35Official Comment, Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(b) (1997). 
36Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(b) (revised 1997); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(e) (1991 
& Supp. 1996).  
37Official Comment, Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act §8.30(a)(1997). 
38Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(b) (revised 1997). 
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of some disagreement among commentators.  At one end of the spectrum, Professor 
Stuart Cohn suggests that the director’s duty to inquire should take effect on the 
basis of alertness to potentially significant concerns.39  This view recognizes that 
directors should be attentive to warnings of future problems.  Manning would expect 
the director to inquire perhaps a little later, when she becomes aware of “credible 
signs of serious trouble.”40  The generally stated requirement found in the ALI 
Principles of Corporate Governance says that the duty of inquiry arises “when, but 
only when, the circumstances would alert a reasonable director … to the need [for 
further inquiry].”41  The Commentary to the Model Act states that a problem must be 
obvious to the director before requiring inquiry,42 suggesting that the duty to inquire 
arises at a point later in time than warnings of potential problems.  
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman Veasey has advocated 
the “red flag doctrine.”  Although directors are not expected to “ferret out” problems 
which they have no reason to suspect exist, Veasey states that when warning signs of 
trouble are obvious, the duty of further inquiry does arise.43  This view recognizes 
the importance of attention to early warning signals, before a problem erupts.  The 
warnings themselves must be obvious, so as to protect the board from having to 
respond to every possible signal of trouble ahead.  Where, however, directors have 
actual evidence of serious problems within the company, commentators agree that 
directors must inquire further.  
D.  The Business Judgment Rule  
The business judgment rule operates as a shield to protect directors from personal 
liability, under certain circumstances, for business decisions that have proved bad for 
the corporation.  Provided the directors acted in good faith, without self-dealing or 
personal interest, and exercised reasonable diligence in making the decision, the 
business judgment rule will protect the directors from liability.44  The policy 
underlying this rule recognizes that directors must make complex decisions, 
balancing risk and benefit to the corporation, often under pressures of time and 
imperfect information.  Provided that the process used by the board to reach the 
decision is sound, and specifically that it conforms to the duty of care standard, it is 
unreasonable for courts to second guess the board.  It is also highly unlikely that a 
judge, ruling years after the fact, will be able to reach any better result.45  
                                                                
39Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards 
and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 602 (1983) 
[hereinafter Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care].  
40Manning, Time for Reality, supra note 19, at 1484. 
41Principles of Corporate Governance, § 4.01(a)(1), American Law Institute (Final draft, 
1992). 
42Official comment, Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.30(a) (revised 1997). 
43Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule, supra note 10, at 1502 (referring to 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)). 
44Gries Sports Enters., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 959, 963-
64 (1986). 
45Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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The business judgment rule  which focuses on decisions  and the director’s 
duty of care  which focuses on the deliberative process  do come together.  If 
directors fail to take adequate care in rendering a decision  to review information 
provided, to inquire for further information when appropriate, to understand the 
fundamentals of the business  then they will find no protection in the business 
judgment rule.  If, however, the directors do reach their decision deliberatively, using 
the information available to them, with good faith in the quality and reliability of the 
information, then even a decision which proves disastrous for the corporation will 
not subject the directors to personal liability.46  
II.  REQUIREMENTS FOR A FINDING OF PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO 
MONITOR 
A director may be held personally liable for losses incurred by the corporation 
which proximately result from the director’s failure to monitor corporate operations.  
The director’s obligation to monitor the activities of the corporation extends over 
business performance as well as compliance with relevant laws.47  “Liability to the 
corporation for a loss may be said to arise from an unconsidered failure of the board 
to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the 
loss.”48  A negligence claim against a director for breach of duty of care requires 
proof of the elements of duty, breach, causation and harm.49 
Having discussed above the general nature of the directors’ duty of care, the 
analysis next turns to these requirements, specifically: the appropriate standard 
governing directors’ duty of care, whether information systems are within the scope 
of the directors’ duty, the nature of the harm to the corporation which may subject 
the director to personal liability, and the difficult task of proving that directors’ 
nonfeasance caused the harm.  
A.  Gross Negligence Standard 
Although state statutory standards vary, “corporate directors are held to a gross 
negligence standard of care, either by statute or under the common law and judicial 
application of the business judgment rule.”50  Twelve states, including Florida, 
Kansas and Ohio, have established the gross negligence standard by statute.51  In 
these states, the statutory enactment appears to have been a direct response to the 
                                                                
46Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care, supra note 39, at 602.  
47In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
[hereinafter In re Caremark]. 
48Id. (emphasis in original). 
49J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MOD. TORT LAW § 3.02 (Rev. ed. 1994, 1998 Supp.) 
50Ronald W. Stevens & Bruce H. Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and 
Officers of Federally Chartered Depository Institutions: It’s Gross Negligence Regardless of 
Whether Section 1821(K) Preempts Federal Common Law, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169, 
193 (1994) [hereinafter Stevens & Neilson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers] 
(article analyses of state statutory and common law regarding corporate directors generally in 
addition to directors of financial institutions). 
51Id. at 194-208.  
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savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.  In the aftermath of this national financial 
debacle, states passed legislation to protect the directors of financial institutions from 
liability for simple negligence in myriad lawsuits by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and its precursor, the Resolution Trust Corporation.52  In eighteen states, 
including Delaware, and the District of Columbia, courts have applied the gross 
negligence standard, often based on the business judgment rule53.  This common law 
rule prevails even where statutes suggest the simple negligence standard of the 
“ordinarily prudent person in like circumstances”, e.g, Maryland and New York.54  
Only four states fully apply the simple negligence standard for corporate directors: 
Georgia, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Tennessee.55  In the remaining sixteen 
states, including California, Illinois and Pennsylvania, “neither the legislature nor the 
courts have clearly established the standard of care for directors and officers of 
financial institutions or corporations.”56 
The business judgment rule and the gross negligence standard combine to 
establish the demanding evidentiary requirement that directors must be shown to 
have acted either in fraud, bad faith, self-dealing, conflict of interest57 or to have 
acted recklessly or with malicious purpose or with deliberate, wanton and reckless 
disregard for the corporation’s interests.58  The Delaware Chancery Court described 
this standard in the corporate context as meaning “reckless indifference to or a 
deliberate disregard of the whole body of shareholders” characterized by actions 
which are “without the bounds of reason.”59  
Underlying the applied gross negligence standard is the judicial view that 
corporations and the economy are not well served by directors who exercise only 
ordinary judgment and prudence.  “The corporate form gets its utility in large part 
from its ability to allow diversified investors to accept greater investment risk.”60  If 
directors are personally liable based on the standard of a person of average judgment 
and risk assessment, directors will tend to make less risky investment decisions, 
which will limit the corporation’s economic potential.61  
It has been argued that the gross negligence standard might be moderated given 
the nature of the HMO business.  One commentator suggested in 1981 that directors 
of HMOs should be held to a higher standard, that is, liable for simple negligence, on 
                                                                
52Id. at 194.  See generally, Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 519 U.S 213 (1997). 
53Stevens & Nielson, The Standard of Care for Directors and Officers, supra note 50, at 
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the reasoning that “[d]irectors of certain significant industries … which are of 
particular public concern, are in fact judged by a higher standard of care.  It is easy to 
make the argument that the HMO industry, like the insurance and banking industries, 
is so complex, important, and vital to the public interest that extraordinary standards 
of care should be imposed on such directors.”62  However easy the argument might 
have been in 1981, and despite public demand for a higher standard of liability for 
directors, the trend in corporate law has clearly headed in the opposite direction, with 
a greater focus on limiting the liability of corporate directors generally.63 
B.  Information Systems are Within the Scope of the Directors’ Duty of Care 
In addition to the general nature of the director’s duty of care is the question of 
whether a particular area of business concern is properly within the scope of that 
duty.  Commentators, courts and regulators have all pinpointed information systems 
as falling within the responsibility of the board of directors.   
A recent decision by the Court of Chancery of Delaware, In re Caremark 
International Inc. Derivative Action64, emphasizes the importance of board oversight 
of information systems.  Noting that timely and relevant information is “an essential 
predicate” for meeting a board’s supervisory and monitoring role under Delaware 
law, the court characterizes the board’s obligation as one of 
assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the 
organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior 
management and … the board itself timely, accurate information 
sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to 
reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance 
with law and its business performance.65 
The board is held to the standard of good faith in determining that the 
information system is conceptually and functionally adequate to the task of assuring 
the board that appropriate information is available in a timely manner.66  The 
Chancellor goes on to say:  
I am of the view that a director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in 
good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system, 
which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to do so 
under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable 
for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.67 
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Regulators also view oversight of information systems as a board responsibility.  
Anticipation of the year 2000 problem, a/k/a “the millenium bug,”68 has prompted 
the Securities Exchange Commission to recommend requiring board approval of the 
year 2000 project plan for public companies.69 
Clearly directors cannot be expected to know the fine details of a system’s design 
or implementation.70  Yet the board must seek credible assurances that adequate 
systems are in place.71  In seeking such assurances, directors are protected from 
liability when they reasonably rely on information from internal and external sources 
provided the directors have reason to believe such sources merit their confidence.72  
C.  Proof of Harm 
In the case of a shareholder derivative action on behalf of the corporation, the 
harm alleged is typically a decline in stock value owing to mismanagement or waste 
of corporate assets.73  A shareholder may also sue for damages individually, where 
she can show injury peculiar to a particular class of shareholders or to shareholder 
interests, as opposed to those of the corporation itself.74  With a nonprofit 
corporation, the alleged harm may be found in the depletion of corporate assets as 
caused, for example, by self-dealing by the directors75, or outright fraud.76  
Alternatively, the harm may be found in the corporation’s failing to carry out its 
charge or the directors approving an act viewed as ultra vires.77  
                                                                
68See, e.g., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP and Affiliates, Board 
Responsibility for Corporate Oversight: Heightened Risk/Mitigation Measures, (Feb. 26, 
1998).  This problem has also given rise to a new specialty in systems consulting, see, e.g., 
Y2K Damage Consultants (visited Nov. 29, 1998) <http://www.y2k-damage-expert.com>.  
Promotional copy for this consultant places high priority on the issue of directors’ liability.  Id.  
“Directors and officers may face scrutiny and potential liability for decisions made in 
connection with purchases of computer hardware and software, as well as their current actions 
in assessing and addressing potential Year 2000 problems.”  Id. 
69SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES 
INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC COMPANIES TO MEET THE INFORMATION PROCESSING CHALLENGES OF 
THE YEAR 2000, at 8 (1999). 
70Manning, Time for Reality, supra note 19, at 1484. 
71Id. 
72See supra notes 36-38 regarding reliance. 
73In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. Shareholder Litig., 729 A.2d 851 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
[hereinafter, In re First Interstate Bancorp]. 
74In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998) [hereinafter In re 
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D.  Proof of Causation  
Clearing the hurdles of establishing the presence and appropriate level of duty of 
care, the plaintiff  must still prove causation.  Where the claim lies in the 
nonfeasance of directors, the causation requirement is made more difficult.  The 
plaintiff must first establish what would have been reasonable actions on the part of 
the board under the circumstances.78  The plaintiff must then prove that the proper 
performance of the directors’ duties would have avoided the loss, and further, what 
loss specifically would have be averted by such action.79  Such a proximate cause 
proof can be fraught with speculation.  “[W]hen a business fails from general 
mismanagement, business incapacity, or bad judgment, how is it possible to say that 
a single director could have made the company successful, or how much in dollars he 
could have saved?”80   
Bad results alone cannot be the basis on which to infer a breach of duty.  In 
Caremark, the Delaware Chancellor noted that “[n]either the fact that the Board, 
although advised by lawyers and accountants, did not accurately predict the severe 
consequences to the company that would ultimately follow from the … strategies 
and practices that ultimately led to this liability, nor the scale of the liability, gives 
rise to an inference of breach of any duty imposed by corporation law upon the 
directors of Caremark.”81 
A key factor in the causation analysis is the timing of directors’ actions.  
Directors may not become aware of a problem until it is too late to take any effective 
remedial action.  In Briggs v. Spaulding,82 a bank insolvency case, two directors who 
had recently joined the board were alleged to have breached their duty of care.  The 
Supreme Court found the defendant directors were woefully inattentive to the affairs 
of the bank, particularly as to oversight of the cashier’s practices.  Yet, the Court 
recognized that even if these directors had made prompt and careful inquiries, such 
action could not have come in time to have saved the bank.  The business was 
already ruined; nothing that the new directors might have done at that point could 
have changed the end result.83 
III.  OVERVIEW OF THE HMO INDUSTRY  
A detailed history of the HMO industry is beyond the scope of this paper.  The 
following provides a general orientation to the industry and its operational 
challenges. 
A.  A Brief History of HMOs 
HMOs exist on a broad continuum of managed care entities.  Managed care is “a 
system which integrates the financing and delivery of appropriate medical care” 
employing features such as contracts with selected physicians and hospitals, 
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utilization and quality controls, financial incentives for patients to stay within the 
contracted provider network; assumption of varying degrees of financial risk by 
providers.84  HMOs are the most restrictive of managed care entities, typically 
requiring enrollees to seek care only through primary care gatekeepers and then only 
by referral to specialists and facilities within the HMOs contracted network.  
The HMOs of today descend from a variety of arrangements under which 
physicians contracted on a pre-paid basis to provide medical services for a group of 
individuals or a business’s employees.85  During the 1930s and 1940s group practices 
formed to serve Kaiser employees at the company’s shipbuilding and construction 
sites; these were the precursors to the Kaiser Foundation Health Plans.86  The Group 
Health Cooperative of Puget Sound and the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New 
York were also established during this period, under similar principles of pre-paid 
group practice.87 
The pre-paid group practice model was not widely adopted in this country until 
the late 1980s.  In the intervening forty years two things restrained the growth of 
HMOs: vigorous opposition by the American Medical Association and the relatively 
low rate of growth in health care costs.  When health care costs began to increase 
sharply in the 1970s, the federal government championed the concept of pre-paid 
group practice with the enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 
1973.88  Even with government subsidies of over $200 million during the 1970s to 
encourage the formation of HMOs by nonprofit groups, HMO enrollment was slow.  
By 1976, HMO membership had reached only six million – falling far short of the 
government’s goal of 40 million by that date.89  It was not until the 1980s when the 
cost of health care soared that employers turned to HMOs with enthusiasm in an 
effort to reduce their health benefits expenditure.90  During the 1980s HMO 
enrollment more than tripled from 10.2 million to 39 million; in 1997 HMO 
enrollment stood at 78 million, including 30% of the population insured through the 
workplace.91 
In the last two years the federal government and most states have turned to the 
HMO model and other forms of managed care to arrest continued cost escalation in 
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Medicare and Medicaid.92  Although many HMOs courted this new membership 
aggressively, this new deal has not been altogether successful.  Recent news reports 
document the steady exodus of managed care plans from these markets as companies 
have found the population more costly to care for than anticipated while 
reimbursement rates are ratcheted down.93  
B.  Different Models of HMOs 
HMOs operate under different models.  In the early days of this delivery system 
the models were fairly distinct.  The most common has been the independent practice 
association (IPA) model, in which the HMO entity contracts with independent 
provider associations or group practices to provide care for enrollees; forty-two 
percent of HMO members are in IPA model plans.94  The staff model, in which the 
HMO employs physicians and other providers, is relatively rare and accounts for 
only about 1% of total HMO enrollment.95  The true group model, in which a single 
physician group contracts exclusively with the health plan, as is the case with the 
various Permanente Medical Groups and the Kaiser Foundation Health Plans, 
accounts for just 11% of total HMO enrollment.96  Under contractual arrangements, 
providers may be reimbursed on a capitation basis, i.e., paid a set fee for each patient 
for each period, on a fee for service basis according to a fee schedule, or on a global 
basis for a defined set of services. 
As the industry has matured, and as employers have demanded greater flexibility 
in pricing and product design, the distinctions among models of care delivery have 
blurred.  “Staff and group model HMOs, faced with limited capital and a need to 
expand into new territories, are forming IPA components.  Meanwhile, some IPAs 
have created staff model primary care centers while continuing to contract with 
physicians in independent practices for specialty services.  HMOs are offering PPO 
[preferred provider organizations] and POS [point of service] products, and some 
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PPOs are obtaining HMO licenses . . . In short, the managed care environment is 
becoming more complicated.”97 
Mixed model plans, those which combine more than one type of delivery model, 
are the fastest growing type of HMO today, increasing membership by 24.2% in 
1997.98  These models reflect the employers’ interest in controlling costs through 
negotiation of different levels of coverage, co-payments and other features for 
employees.  By offering a range of benefits and product design to employers, HMOs 
not only help the employer satisfy their employees’ desire for choices, but also help 
the employer hold down the administrative costs by reducing the number of health 
plan providers with which the employer must work. 
C.  Growth of for Profit HMOs 
Another change in the environment is the dominance of “for profit” plans.  
Although the earliest plans were nonprofit, and the HMO Act of 1973 actively 
encouraged the development of such plans, most HMO members today are enrolled 
in for profit plans. For profit plan enrollment has grown from forty-two percent in 
1987 to the current rate of sixty-two percent.99  An estimated sixty-eight percent100 of 
the nation’s 760 HMOs are for profit,101 serving sixty-two percent of total HMO 
enrollment.102 
D.  Competitive Environment 
HMOs operate in a highly competitive environment characterized by rising costs, 
consolidation, and price sensitivity.  In 1997, the overall increase in costs was 
6.4%,103 with a major contribution from the rise in pharmacy costs, the fastest 
growing line item in health plan budgets.104  Health plans have raised premium 
prices, but analysts suggest that rate increases alone will not be enough to maintain 
profitability as payers will balk and look elsewhere for coverage.105  Plans have had 
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to seek other strategies to maintain membership while keeping earnings in the black.  
Consolidation is one of these strategies. 
Aetna’s move to acquire Prudential Healthcare for $1 billion is only the latest in 
a number of health care mergers and acquisitions.106  In 1998, for example, 
Protective Life Corp. purchased United Dental Care, resulting in the nation’s third-
largest dental managed care company and WellPoint Health Networks, Inc. reached 
outside the west coast region to buy Cerulean Cos. Inc., the largest health insurer in 
Georgia.107  Among Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) plans, mergers and acquisitions 
have reduced the number of plans from 128 to 56 since 1975.108  One of the most 
recent of these mergers will combine the BCBS plans in Delaware, Maryland and the 
District of Columbia.109 
Consolidation gives the HMO increased market power and leverage over 
providers.  With health care costs on the rise, and payers resistant to bearing the 
whole burden, larger plans can exert concentrated pressure on providers to lower fees 
and costs.110  The potential for monopolistic market power is one reason why the 
A.M.A. urged the Department of Justice to prevent Aetna’s acquiring Prudential.111  
Consolidation can give plans greater economies of scale.  With more than 700 
HMOs operating in the country, payers still have choices among HMOs in most 
areas of the country.  By consolidating, plans can offer ever larger networks to 
payers in both local and regional markets, combined with the administrative 
convenience of dealing with a single health plan.  
E.  Regulatory Environment 
HMOs are subject to extensive regulation at the state and federal levels.  State 
insurance and health departments typically share responsibility for HMOs.  Insurance 
department oversight usually includes approval of premium rates and contract terms, 
requirements for adequate cash reserves to cover projected claims and holding 
members harmless for the cost of care covered by premiums;112 many states also 
impose interest penalties for late claims payment.  State health departments oversee 
the provision of health care services, looking to ensure that access to care meets 
prescribed standards of waiting time and physicians’ offices meet safety and 
equipment maintenance standards.113  Penalties for violations of state regulation can 
include fines and restrictions on new enrollment until required corrections are made. 
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At the federal level, HMOs are subject to stringent regulation.  The HMO Act 
dictates how HMOs are organized and operated to maintain federal qualification.114  
HMOs must comply with these rules in order to contract with the federal government 
for coverage of Medicare beneficiaries.  The Medicare and Medicaid programs 
impose criminal fines and imprisonment penalties for fraud and abuse.115  U.S. 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines116 provide a uniform sentencing structure for 
organizations which violate federal criminal statutes and “provide for penalties that 
equal or often massively exceed those previously imposed on corporations.”117  The 
Guidelines provide an incentive for all organizations to have compliance programs in 
place.  The knowing or willfully ignorant involvement of high-level personnel 
(which includes directors) in an offense covered by the Sentencing Guidelines 
creates a rebuttable presumption that the organization lacked an effective program to 
prevent and detect violations of the law.118  
The civil penalties for Medicare fraud and abuse include fines and exclusion 
from federal programs.  “For providers dependent on Medicare and Medicaid for a 
large share of their business, exclusion from these programs can be effectively a 
death warrant.”119  
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)120 is also 
pertinent to HMOs, and specifically to directors.  “Over 70% of privately-insured 
Americans are insured through employment-related group benefits plans that are 
subject to ERISA regulation”.121  With 30% of the privately-insured population 
enrolled in HMOs, it is to be expected that most HMOs have some members in 
ERISA plans.  Among its myriad provisions governing the funding and 
administration of employee benefit plans, ERISA defines the duty of care of plan 
fiduciaries, which may include directors, officers, employees and well as 
organizations122, as that of a prudent person under like circumstances.123  By statute, 
fiduciaries are personally liable for any losses suffered by the employee benefits plan 
which result from a breach of duty, and may additionally be subject to other 
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equitable and remedial relief as deemed appropriate by the courts.124  In contrast to 
courts’ application of the gross negligence standard under state statutes, courts 
applying ERISA have found fiduciaries liable using the simple negligence 
standard.125   
F.  Operational and Data Processing Requirements for HMOs126 
To a great extent, managing care is an exercise in managing information.  This is 
especially true in the plans that deliver health care services through contractual 
arrangements with hospitals, physicians and other providers.  As noted above, 
distinctions in the delivery system are increasing and reimbursement arrangements 
with providers vary.  This section summarizes at a high level the general 
requirements of an IPA model HMO.  
Beyond the informational requirements of any business, such as payroll, general 
ledger, business accounts receivable and payable, HMOs’ special data processing 
needs fall into three general categories: membership and accounts, provider 
contracts, and claims and benefits.127 
1.  Membership  
Membership demographics must be maintained for every enrolled member.  This 
information includes name and address, date of birth, sex, additional coverage for 
coordination of benefits, and the selection of a primary care provider.  Member 
information will be tied to the account under which members enroll, typically the 
employer group, but also government programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.  
Within a single employer group there may be subgroups such as management and 
hourly workers, union and non-union members, each of which may have different 
benefits.  There may be different eligibility dates for members, for example, three 
months after hire. 
2.  Accounts 
HMOs depend on the employer group to provide prompt updates of changes to 
membership.  Particularly with large groups, such as those with multiple offices, 
keeping this information current is difficult.  It is not uncommon for membership 
updates to be delayed.  This results in retroactive disenrollment.  The employer will 
deduct any premium payment for the employee on subsequent bills, as well as 
retroactive to the time the member lost eligibility.  Practically speaking this means a 
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member can continue to receive care in the plan for weeks or months after he has left 
his job or dropped his insurance with no premium payment to offset the expense.  
Certain accounts are prone to high turnover in their employees.  Government 
accounts, among the largest customers of any insurance plan, experience steady ebb 
and flow of employees.  Businesses which tend to hire large numbers of young 
people who stay for one or two years, such as consulting firms and large banks, also 
fit this pattern.  Particularly prone to volatility are Medicaid plans because recipient 
eligibility can shift from month to month depending on changes in assets, income 
and family status.  High volatility makes current and accurate membership reporting 
a challenge.  
Employers may purchase unique benefits, adding to or reducing a standard 
package.  Religious organizations often exclude abortion and sterilization services, 
government funded programs may limit these services to particular circumstances.  
One large national employer with ties to a particular church at one time extended 
dependent coverage beyond the usual age cut-off to those who were serving as 
missionaries.  
The majority of employer groups renew in January, with most of the rest doing so 
in July.  Although the decision-making process for members begins months in 
advance at the work site, this timing nonetheless results in a crush of work to set up 
accounts and complete enrollment at the HMO.  Annual account contracts are the 
norm.  This means that if there is an error in pricing the benefits, the HMO cannot 
change the premium for another year.  
Many accounts will include performance measures in the HMO contract.  
Standards of timeliness and accuracy of claims payments and responsiveness in 
customer service are typical of such arrangements.  Contractually agreed upon 
penalties may include  premium reduction and interest payments.  
3.  Providers 
HMOs collect and update detailed information on every provider with whom they 
contract.  In the case of physicians and other individual practitioners, this 
information will include office addresses, specialty qualifications, fee schedule or 
capitation rates, limitations on services covered by the contract and tax identification 
numbers.  A single provider practicing at the same location may have different 
contracts with the same HMO depending upon the provider’s specialty.  For 
example, a physician such as a pediatric cardiologist may have both a primary care 
contract at a capitated rate and a separate specialty contract for cardiology services 
reimbursed according to a fee schedule.  In addition, providers who practice in two 
or more locations may have separate contracts and reimbursement rates based, for 
example, on the size of the enrolled membership in each region.   
Primary care physicians are typically responsible for a defined group of patients, 
the “panel”.  For these providers an additional file of those members must be 
maintained for accurate calculation of monthly capitation as well as to determine 
whether the panel is open for new enrollment.  The problem of retroactive 
disenrollment mentioned above is problematic for capitated providers.  In this 
circumstance not only is the member dropped from the provider’s panel but the 
retroactive capitation for that member will be deducted from the provider’s 
reimbursement as well. 
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4.  Claims and Benefits Administration 
The major area in which membership and provider data must interact accurately 
is in claims and benefits administration.  Typically when a patient leaves the 
capitation environment of primary care to seek specialty or hospital care, they must 
obtain an authorization from the primary care physician.  The authorization operates 
as the ticket to the specialist’s office; it also serves to alert the HMO of a pending 
claim liability.  After the specialist treats the patient, a claim is sent to the HMO for 
payment. 
For a claim to be paid properly the supporting data on the system must be current 
and valid.128  The planets, as it were, must be in alignment.  For example: 
• The member must be currently enrolled at the time of service. 
• The service must be covered by the member’s benefit plan. 
• The service must be age and sex appropriate (e.g., no gynecological 
services for men, no obstetrical services for women over or under 
certain ages). 
• The nature and extent of the services performed must not exceed 
those that are authorized (e.g., a five day stay at a hospital when only 
three days have been authorized.) 
• The provider number must be correct and the provider must be 
appropriate for the type of services billed (e.g., psychiatrists do not 
bill for orthopedic surgery.) 
• The service performed must be appropriate for the setting in which it 
was performed (e.g., no open heart surgery at an office location.) 
• There must be an authorization in the system which is current (many 
plans limit the life of an authorization to a period of days or months.) 
• The reimbursement must be the correct amount for that provider at 
that location, either the agreed fee schedule rate or “usual and 
customary” as established by the plan. 
Although not exhaustive, this list suffices to convey the general extent of 
information required for the task of claims payment.  
5.  Point of Service Plans 
An HMO may also offer additional products or options to customers which 
increase the data intensity of the process just described.  Point of service (POS) plans 
are one popular option in the managed care marketplace.  Under a POS plan a 
member may directly seek care outside of the HMO network, providing they pay 
extra for the privilege.  POS plans relieve some of the restrictions of the HMO by 
permitting members to see the specialist of their choice.  In addition to paying a 
higher premium for this hybrid product, the member typically pays coinsurance of 
20-30% of the usual and customary charge.129  Some HMOs may vary the 
limitations, such as still requiring the primary care physician to authorize the visit. 
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The POS model offers the best of both worlds to accounts and members alike.  
Employers like the aspect of consumer choice, which keeps employees happy, yet 
the account benefits from the ongoing cost containment of HMOs because the 
employee pays the difference out of pocket.  Members appreciate the safety valve 
aspect of POS plans, knowing that they have the option of seeing a desired provider 
who is not in the network, or an in-network provider for whom the primary care 
physician may be unwilling to issue an authorization.  
The advantages of POS plans for consumers are not without drawbacks.  
Members may find their out-of-pocket expenses higher than expected when the 
HMO applies its own “usual and customary” limit to the provider’s bill.  This can 
result in the member having to pay 100% of the excess charge in addition to the 
expected coinsurance.130  In spite of this potential problem POS plans are the fastest 
growing sector in health insurance.131 
For the HMO, the information system demands of this appealing product are 
considerable.  The discussion above regarding the importance of coordinated and 
timely data takes on even greater weight with POS products.  This is particularly true 
when a member opts to see a contracted specialist, but does so without an 
authorization.  The information system will have to determine if the service is 
payable under the POS model (which means the member has to pay out of pocket, 
and the specialist’s reimbursement might be higher than the in-plan contracted rate) 
or if the service was an authorized visit for which the authorization has not yet hit the 
system (in which case the member pays no coinsurance and the provider is paid the 
appropriate contractual rate.) 
Depending on the timing of the receipt of information, and the speed and 
accuracy of data entry, particularly for authorizations, providers may easily be paid 
at the wrong rates, members may be charged incorrectly for coinsurance, and both 
may experience delays in payment due to the absence of preliminary data on the 
system.  These circumstances can effect not only the accuracy of payment, but also 
the quality of customer service to both members and providers, as well as regulatory 
requirements for prompt payment of valid claims.  These operating and business 
risks of POS plans clearly raise the bar in demanding highly effective information 
systems for the HMO. 
6.  IBNR or “The Black Art” 
IBNR stands for incurred but not reported.  This acronym refers to “[t]he amount 
of money that the plan had better accrue for medical expenses that it knows nothing 
about yet.  These are medical expenses that the authorization system has not captured 
and for which claims have not yet hit the door.  Unexpected IBNRs have torpedoed 
more managed care plans than any other cause.”132 
HMOs operate on a future orientation.  Premium rates are based on the expected 
utilization for a given population.  At any one time, a substantial amount of the care 
for which a plan is liable lies in the future because the total membership is receiving 
care on an ongoing basis.  “If the costs are simply booked as they come in, disaster is 
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132Glossary, in THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 995-96 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 
3d ed. 1996). 
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certain.”133  IBNR is a primary vehicle for forecasting expenses and trends in care 
costs as well as trends in the type and setting of care which is being provided under 
the plan.  It is also the basis on which plans calculate statutory reserve and cash flow 
requirements.  
A particularly troublesome aspect of faulty accrual for IBNRs is the tailing effect.  
A plan which underaccrues for IBNR in one period cannot easily solve the problem 
in the next period because the expenses were already accrued and “keep rolling 
in.”134  Each month’s accruals have to be adjusted, and the expenses for prior periods 
suffer as well as for the current one.135  “Monthly performance gets muddied up with 
adjustments for prior performance, and managers find themselves chasing their 
tails.”136  Other systemic problems which contribute to faulty INBRs include rapid 
growth in membership, inadequate premium due to low-balling rates or poor 
collections, or flawed rating methodologies.137 
Aptly characterized by the Wall Street Journal as “the black art”138 of HMOs, 
accurate IBNR projections depend on the timeliness and quality of data already in 
the system.  Any problems with the validity of membership, claims or authorizations 
data, the reporting system for these data, or the plan’s lag studies (which inform 
management of aging of claims and amounts paid out for past and current periods 
compared to accruals for these periods 139) can severely affect the accuracy of the 
IBNR projections.  
7.  Medical Management 
The same factors which influence the validity of the IBNR calculations are those 
on which HMOs rely to manage care.  Unlike a retail store which can observe the 
flow of its physical inventory, HMOs depend entirely upon data to carry out 
managed care’s eponymous function.  “Medical management reports are… 
absolutely necessary tools for managers of health plans.”140  “Accurate membership 
counts are necessary to compute ‘cost per employee’ statistics, which are the basis of 
comparing utilization patterns from one period to the next.”141  Prompt and accurate 
claims and authorization systems are an obvious necessity for effective management 
                                                                
133Peter R. Kongstvedt, Common Operational Problems in Managed Health Care Plans, 
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140Peter R. Kongstvedt, Using Data in Medical Management, in THE MANAGED HEALTH 
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of the services for which a plan is liable.  Only through data does the plan identify 
systemic utilization problems, such as plan-wide overuse of emergency room 
services.  Trends of this type require different remedies than those that can be traced 
to a particular provider or medical group or population.142  
From this brief survey of the operational side of HMOs, it is apparent that a 
sound, well designed and properly implemented information system is perhaps the 
single most important determinant of an HMO’s long term success.  Accurate and 
timely information is essential for the successful delivery of the HMO’s health care 
product. And, as with any business, the information system is the chief tool used by 
management and board to identify the signs of incipient business and compliance 
problems.  The Board’s responsibility to oversee the effectiveness of the information 
systems extends over all of these areas.  
This article now turns to Oxford Health Plans, Inc., as a case study in how an 
HMO’s faulty information system can precipitate business losses and regulatory 
violations and expose the directors to personal liability for their failure to monitor the 
system’s development and implementation.  
IV.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF OXFORD HEALTH PLAN 
Oxford Health Plans, Inc. (Oxford), a Delaware corporation, provides health 
benefit plans through various subsidiaries in New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Florida and Illinois.  Oxford was founded by 
Stephen Wiggins in 1984 as an innovative, customer focused and non-bureaucratic 
organization which would win the hearts of its consumer customers.  
Oxford experienced steady membership growth into the mid 1990s when the pace 
became explosive.  By the end of 1997 total membership exceeded two million 
members.143  Together with membership growth came a steady rise in earnings and 
stock price.  The one-time darling of Wall Street made its initial public offering in 
1991 at $2.25; at it peak in July, 1997 Oxford’s stock traded at $89.144  That was 
before October 27, 1997 when the stock fell sixty-two percent and the company 
shifted into a spiral of losses from which it has yet to recover fully. 
A.  Business Strategy and Culture 
Like every other HMO, Oxford had a challenge in information systems, but 
certain characteristics of Oxford’s business strategy and corporate culture put even 
greater demands on the systems.  
Capitalizing early on the promise of point-of-service plans, Oxford introduced 
the “Freedom Plan” in 1988.  This plan would account for 59.2% of total premiums, 
serving 1.3 million members by 1997.145  As discussed above, POS plans make 
prodigious demands on the information systems for timeliness and accuracy; given 
the substantial membership enrolled in this program, the pressure on the system to 
perform was even greater.  
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Oxford was also an innovator in the types of service it would cover, being among 
the first HMOs to offer access to nontraditional types of care, such as acupuncture 
and herbal medicine within its network.146  While undoubtedly a crowd pleaser, one 
result of this business strategy would have been an increased system demand to 
support an expansion of the provider network.  Because access to non-traditional 
providers had not previously been offered, these practitioners would most likely not 
have been on the provider file, and so their addition represents a net increase in file 
volume.  The files might also require some modification as the credentialing 
requirements for non-traditional providers could differ from traditional providers. 
In 1997, in response to customer demand for better cost management, Oxford 
introduced an entirely new patient care and reimbursement strategy for members 
with chronic illnesses or other major health problems.147  This program permitted 
qualified patients to select their own specialists without a referral.  The 
reimbursement innovation was to pay the specialists a flat rate for the entire episode 
of care, from diagnostic tests, through surgery to post-operative rehabilitation.  
Although flat cases rates have been used by many HMOs, the scope of services 
subject to the rate was much greater than the industry norm.  
The success of this innovative reimbursement and care program was highly 
dependent upon an effective information system.  This program called for putting “a 
wealth of information at the  members’ fingertips, including [physicians’] 
backgrounds, rates, and results  from previous cases and patient satisfaction 
surveys.”148  On the payment side, providers were to be paid in stages as the 
treatment progressed, based on reporting back to the health plan.149  To support this 
program on an information system, some of the steps involved would be:  to 
distinguish which patients were allowed under this payment scheme from those who 
were regular Oxford members; to distinguish for these specially participating 
providers a separate fee schedule and to establish a unique payment mechanism 
which recognizes an incremental and variable progression of treatment. 
The information processing complexity of this unique payment scheme becomes 
apparent when compared to the conventional case rate contract.  Obstetricians, for 
example, are often paid a flat rate for prenatal care, delivery and one post-partum 
visit; the rate will vary depending on whether the delivery was normal or via 
Cesarean.150  A single payment is made following the delivery. 
In contrast, the Oxford payment arrangement calls for incremental payments 
based on stages of progress in a treatment protocol, which may or may not be 
represented by a single procedure code, and may quite possibly comprise a number 
of procedures.  This means the protocol itself must be coded into the system so as to 
permit incremental progress to be recorded; a pricing break-down of the incremental 
                                                                
146Reed Abelson, Behind the Bleeding at Oxford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at D1 
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steps is required; given the complexity of the patient’s condition such as would put 
them into this program in the first place it is reasonable to assume that not all 
patients will have the same exact progress.  Such a scheme is not impossible to 
analyze and code; it is, however, complex and time consuming. 
Oxford was not modest in its expectations of the scale of this program, projecting 
savings of twenty to thirty percent over current specialty care costs.151  Given 
Oxford’s total specialty care costs account for about $1.7 billion out of a total $2.2 
billion of medical expenses,152 this program was projected to save between $300 
million and $500 million.  
The corporate culture of Oxford also contributed to extraordinary pressures on 
the information systems.  Priding itself as iconoclastic and anti-bureaucratic, Oxford 
eschewed standard procedures.  Provider contracts were creatively negotiated, 
sometimes with changes made at the last minute to mollify practitioners.153  Such a 
strategy can improve relationships with providers by showing flexibility and 
responsiveness.  But the fruits of creativity can often be hard to code into a logical 
system.154  In 1997, Oxford had a provider network of over 60,000 providers, most of 
whom contracted individually and directly with the health plan.155  Even if only a 
fraction of the providers negotiated unique contracts, the toll in human and system 
resources to code and maintain these special provisions could mount quickly. 
B.  Membership Growth 
Added to the volatile mix of business strategy and corporate culture  was 
explosive growth in membership.  Of the two million members in the plan by the end 
of 1997 roughly half had joined in the last two years.156  In the New York plan alone, 
the growth rate was 300% for this period.157  A critical source of this growth came in 
the aggressive pursuit of Medicare and Medicaid business, bringing in members who 
                                                                
151Blecher, The Gate Swings Wider, supra note 147. 
152Id. 
153Winslow & Paltrow, Ill-Managed Care, supra note 138.  
154Recall the dependent missionary coverage example from discussion supra section 
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are usually sicker and certainly older than the rest of the plan’s membership.158  
Medicare membership grew to 161,000 by year end 1997, or eight percent of total 
membership, yet this program accounted for twenty-two percent of total 
premiums.159  Medicaid membership for the same period reached 189,600, 
accounting for 7.7% of total premiums.160 
C.  In-house Development of Oxford’s Information System 
In 1993, Oxford decided to develop its own new information system, rejecting 
the option to buy an existing system.  In early 1996, the old system was staggering 
under the pressures of membership growth and claims backlogs were growing.161  
During 1996, company officials turned up the heat to complete the new system, 
“racing against the clock”, according to one insider.162  In September 1996, the 
company converted from the old to the new system largely in “one fell swoop.”163 
Almost immediately the system failed at essential tasks.  The process of entering 
membership stretched up to fifteen minutes in some cases.164  Efforts to link the old 
and new systems, to facilitate pulling up old information, ended up corrupting data 
on both sides.165  Claims payment appears to have ground to a near halt.166  By late 
1996, unpaid provider claims had risen to $625 million.167 
While no system implementation is immune from problems, it appears that haste 
and lack of testing are two obvious culprits in the disaster at Oxford.168  Hubris, too, 
played a part.  One company insider told the Wall Street Journal, “[T]hey thought 
they could do almost anything better than anybody else … [b]ut they were novices at 
developing software.”169 
While developing an in-house system in any business is neither impossible nor 
necessarily a recipe for disaster, there are known pitfalls.  One industry expert 
suggests that self-developed software is often a poor business choice as, compared to 
expectations, it typically yields only half the desired functionality, but costs twice as 
much and takes twice as long to develop and implement.170  This rule of thumb even 
applies to organizations which have experience in systems development.  
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A 1979 study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) on software development 
projects for government agencies found a number of common problems when 
organizations chose to develop software instead of purchasing existing products.171  
While this study examined contracts with consultants for software development, 
many of the problems identified by the GAO apply equally in the case of a business 
developing its own systems.  These included: failure of top management to commit 
appropriate management resources and trained staff to the project, failure of staff to 
prepare complete business requirements prior to system design, unanticipated 
changes to the scope of work  and inadequate testing.172  This study also found that 
the total cost and development times for the software development work were twice 
the original estimates.173 
Migrating from one information system to another is no easy task.  During the 
migration period both the old and new systems must be supported, as part of the 
process to verify the integrity of the new system.174  “This [migration] process is 
complex and requires numerous resources, both user and IS [information systems] 
operations involvement, and a strong organizational commitment to be successful.  
Conversion strategies and work plans should be developed in advance for all of the 
following: infrastructure migration, application migration, process improvement 
(developing new procedures to capitalize on the efficiencies of the new application), 
training schedules and job definitions.”175  This characterization of the steps 
necessary to assure a smooth conversion is at odds with insiders’ description of the 
process at Oxford as well as that of the New York Insurance Department 
(Department) which noted poor planning, inexperienced management, and 
inadequate systems testing as important factors in the system’s failure.176 
The system flaws at Oxford were stunningly apparent and largely unexpected.177  
Inability to process claims properly resulted in backlogs that stretched into the 
hundreds of millions of dollars.  Oxford resorted to paying providers lump-sum 
settlements, explained as “loans” to be reconciled against actual claims when the 
company caught up with the claims backlog.178  Without recent detailed claims 
history, it became difficult to project the IBNR expense or reserve requirements. 
On the membership side, difficulties maintaining accurate membership data 
resulted in billing problems.  Bills to accounts were often late or wrong; eventually it 
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appears the plan just stopped billing some accounts entirely.179  As a result Oxford 
didn’t know how many members it had, who they were and whether or not their 
premiums were paid.  Eventually the plan would write off care costs for some 30,000 
members who had either disenrolled at the time they received care, or refused to pay 
because they had not been properly billed.180  
On the cost management front the inability to process claims and membership 
meant that no meaningful cost tracking could be maintained.  During 1997, for 
example, while Medicare revenue rose 4.3%, unbeknownst to the company, the 
expenses for this population rose twenty-one percent.181 
From the time of the system implementation in September, 1996, Oxford 
management had strenuously denied the extent of the problems.  Stephen Wiggins 
repeated expressed confidence to members, providers and regulators that the systems 
problems were just about fixed.  In response to a fiery complaint from the New York 
State Society of Oncologists and Hematologists, complaining of excuses for 
computer problems and delayed claims payments, Wiggins wrote back accusing the 
Society of “resort[ing] to extremism and slander in an attempt to serve your clients’ 
interests.”182  The company accepted that it had a big problem when the New York 
State Insurance Superintendent, Neil Levin, demanded to meet with the board of 
directors to discuss the Department’s concerns about the company’s operations.  
D.  Announcement of Losses Leads to Drop in Stock Price 
On October 27, 1997, the day before Levin was to meet with the board, Oxford 
announced its first quarterly loss in its thirteen year history.  The stock price 
plummeted sixty-two percent that day, resulting in a three billion dollar paper loss.183  
At the time of the announcement, Wiggins confidently estimated the company would 
return to profitability soon.  He would never again have cause for such optimism.  
Later, “[u]nder pressure from the New York State Department of Insurance, Oxford 
acknowledged it had misjudged the cost of care and would take a charge against 
fourth quarter earnings and show a loss for the year.”184  
E.  Investigation by the New York Insurance Department 
On May 9, 1997, spurred by complaints from consumers and providers about 
claims payment delays by HMOs and other insurance entities, New York Governor 
George Pataki ordered the state Insurance Department to launch a major 
investigation into the health insurers’ claims payment practices.185  Oxford was the 
first HMO targeted for this examination.  
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Following a months-long and contentious examination, the Insurance Department 
issued its Market Conduct Report on Oxford in late December, 1997.  Specific to 
Oxford’s operations and systems the report concluded that Oxford continued to 
experience significant delays in claims payment, still could not quantify the claims 
backlog, and lacked procedures to ensure compliance with New York state law and 
regulations.186  While the report attributed much of the operational problems to the 
newly implemented information system, it found that “underlying [these concerns] is 
the problem that many of the issues described herein appear to be caused simply by 
poor planning and/or inexperienced management.”187 
As a result of the investigation, the Department fined Oxford three million dollars 
for violations of state laws and regulations.188  In addition, the Department ordered 
Oxford to pay $500,000 in restitution to customers and health care providers related 
to unapproved contracts and rates.189  Oxford agreed to a number of corrective 
actions.  Among those related to the systems problems included commitments to:  
1. Evaluate, augment and where necessary, replace senior management in 
consultation with the Board of Oxford Health Plans, Inc. 
2. Strengthen the Board by the addition of at least two outside directors. 
3. Retain an outside management consultant to evaluate the information 
systems, internal controls and management reporting. 
4. Strengthen and augment internal controls and procedures capable of 
generating reliable data concerning claims, premiums and expenses.190  
When the dust finally cleared, Oxford reported losses of $291 million for 1997,191 
and paid an additional $200 million into reserves.192  By the end of 1998, the 
company had lost a reported $952 million over the previous five quarters.193  The 
stock has fallen from a peak of $89 a share in July, 1997194 to a low of $7.375 a year 
later.195  The stock has recovered somewhat, trading at $13.75 on December 23, 
1998.196 
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Unexpected payments to reserves resulted in a reduction of the company’s equity 
to roughly $400 million by year end 1997.197  Oxford sought financing to meet its 
reserve requirements, borrowing $100 million in short term funding from Donaldson, 
Lufkin & Jenrette in February and March, 1998.198  The company also secured $700 
million in debt and additional equity financing, increasing internal borrowing costs 
and diluting the value of outstanding shares.199  Investment analysts have been wary 
of continued losses which could result in increased reserve requirements and further 
dilution of outstanding shares.200  
Stephen Wiggins resigned as chairman in February, 1998.201  He remains on the 
Oxford board today, having served on a three member executive committee charged 
with helping turn around the company.  In January, 1998 the company named 
Norman D. Payson, a physician and former CEO of Healthsource, Inc., as Oxford’s 
new CEO-elect.  Dr. Payson “plunked down $10 million of his hard-earned money 
for Oxford’s stock.”202  Not many others are following suit.  Anxiety over the 
company’s anticipated future losses and concern over the company’s lack of 
communication with the investment community have made potential investors 
leery.203  
As for the information system at the root of many of Oxford’s problems, which 
cost upwards of $100 million to develop, the company decided in March, 1998 to 
scrap it.204  At that time, Oxford was considering alternative systems approaches, 
including outsourcing functions to a third party or replacing the failed systems 
completely with one or more systems available on the market from third party 
vendors.205  The company estimated that it would take another twelve to eighteen 
months to identify and implement the alternative system solution.206 
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V.  LESSONS FROM OXFORD - HOW DO DIRECTORS MEET THEIR DUTY OF CARE?  
Oxford’s management and directors will soon be subject to great scrutiny in the 
courts.  In the aftermath of the stock price drop in late October, 1997, Oxford faces a 
battery of lawsuits and government inquiries.  As of April, 1998, over forty-five suits 
were filed against the company and its officers and directors alleging violations of 
disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.207  In addition, at 
least ten shareholder derivative actions have been filed.208  Oxford expects more 
litigation to follow.209  The Attorney General of New York, the Securities Exchange 
Commission, and the Health Care Financing Administration have all initiated their 
own investigations of the company.210 
It will be some time before the details of the decisions and actions of Oxford’s 
directors will be fully known.  For this reason, much of the discussion which follows 
is speculative.  Yet, Oxford’s experience illustrates, by omission rather than 
commission, the steps that the board of a large HMO or health insurer might be 
expected to take when considering the strategic decision of changing the 
organization’s information system, a decision with major implications for the success 
of the business and for effective corporate compliance with state and federal laws.  
There are three timeframes of interest, each with a key question.  First, at the 
point of the original decision in 1993 to develop a system internally, did the board 
fully understand the risks and benefits of this strategy?  Second, once the decision 
was taken to build the system as opposed to buy one, what steps did the board take to 
monitor this project in keeping with the board’s duty of oversight?  Third, once the 
system conversion occurred, were there sufficient warning signs to trigger the 
board’s duty of inquiry before October, 1997?  
A.  Decision to Build an In-house Information System 
In general, courts are loathe to second guess a business decision by directors, 
provided that the process of reaching the decision is considered deliberately and in 
good faith, or was otherwise rational.211  In the case of Oxford, the existing 
information system was clearly inadequate for the anticipated growth in membership 
and complexity of current and future products.212  As such, a decision to change or 
enhance the system would have a rational basis as it would be viewed as essential for 
the future success of the business. 
Given Oxford’s innovative approach to product design and focus on customer 
service, the decision to reject existing systems from third party vendors may have 
been rational if the systems available on the market did not offer the unique 
functionality the company required.  Companies routinely make “buy or build” 
decisions based on the specific needs of the business, the skills of management and 
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other personnel, and the relative costs and benefits of products available in the 
marketplace.  
The key question in this circumstance is whether the board fully understood the 
business risks involved in developing the system in-house.  Did management present 
information to the board which identified the potential risks, such as the likelihood 
that self-developed software ultimately yields lower functionality at greater cost and 
time to implement than anticipated?  Was the board informed of the required skill 
level of personnel to lead and carry out such a project?  Did the company employ or 
plan to recruit staff with these skills?  Did management seek external expertise, such 
as management or systems consultants, to advise on the merits and risks of this 
decision?  Was the board provided with the information from the consultants?  A 
court would consider all of these factors when determining whether the board 
followed a reasonable process in reaching the decision. 
Another element in a decision to develop a system in-house is the foregone 
protections of the vendor contract.  Whether a business purchases a complete 
information system from, or develops one collaboratively with, a vendor the 
purchaser has the benefit of certain protections.  First, presumably the vendor has 
expertise.213  Additionally, the contract terms will typically include beneficial 
provisions for the purchaser, such as incremental delivery dates, financial penalties 
for missed deadlines, warranties such as assurances of Year 2000 compliance, 
binding arbitration provisions, and requirements that the vendor have adequate 
insurance coverage for errors and omission.214 
Because of the contractual relationship with the vendor, the purchaser also has a 
number of legal bases on which to rely.  These may include actions for breach of 
warranty for fitness for a particular use, breach of implied warranty of 
merchantability, breach of express warranties as to the ability of the system to meet 
the client’s objectives, common law fraud, violation of state deceptive practices 
statutes, and violation of the Lanham Act.215  The law of contracts will permit a 
plaintiff to recover direct and consequential damages or alternatively to sue for 
specific performance.216  Fraud actions may result in awards for punitive damages.217  
Obviously the threat of legal action on a contract is no guarantee of perfection, 
but the risk of legal action does serve, at a minimum, to incline the vendor towards 
agreed upon performance.  In addition, the vendor company has its own reputation in 
the marketplace to consider, positively in terms of satisfied customers, and the 
predictable opposite. 
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Finally, because of the high rate of change in information technology, as well as 
in the health care industry, in-house development exposes the company to the risk of 
the system being out-of-date in a short time.218  While vendors also assume this risk, 
a technology vendor can be expected to stay up-to-date in system and industry trends 
in order to compete effectively for new business; presumably the cost to the vendor 
in staff time and research is recovered through its pricing methodology.  A purchaser 
in another business is less likely to make the investment in staff, education and 
research necessary to stay at the forefront of the information technology industry. 
Once a company has decided to build an in-house system, its directors might 
reasonably be expected to inquire of management how the company would 
compensate for the lack of contractual protections.  For example, will the company 
acquire systems expertise through hiring new staff?  Will project leaders and staff 
receive incentive compensation based on value to the company of the fully 
implemented system?  Can the project itself be insured?  What specific actions can 
management take to mitigate the tendency of self-development projects to fail to 
meet expectations?  By posing such questions directors can demonstrate their 
understanding of the risks inherent in the decision to build an in-house system. 
B.  Monitoring the Information Systems Development Project 
Once the decision is made to build a system in-house, a board faces another set of 
questions related to appropriate monitoring of the development process.  Who will be 
accountable for the project? What are the quality assurance procedures, plans and 
milestones for key phases in the design, development and implementation process?  
What are the fail-safe or fall back provisions in the event that development is 
delayed and business operations are threatened?  What reports will the board receive 
throughout this process so that directors can judge for themselves that the project is 
proceeding according to plan?  How can the reports be validated to ensure that they 
are accurate?  How will the board assure itself that the ongoing business and 
compliance requirements of the company are being met during the system 
development and implementation phases?  
When a system is developed entirely in-house, the corporation has neither the 
actual remedies nor the threat of meaningful legal action to encourage performance 
by staff.  While a company may dismiss an employee for negligence, to recover 
damages the company must prove that the employee was accountable for the harm 
done.  At Oxford, such accountability appeared to be wholly lacking.  When the 
extent of the disaster became known in October, 1997, a number of the company’s 
financial analysts offered their resignations.  Wiggins refused to accept them, 
reportedly saying “[w]e were all blindsided here.  This wasn’t something you could 
point to a single person to hold responsible for.”219  
That the chairman of the board believed there was no single person accountable 
for the success of a project of the scale, complexity and critical nature of this system 
in itself suggests that the board failed in at least this aspect of oversight.  In any 
event, when the person perhaps most identified with the company’s failure, Wiggins 
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himself, resigned as chairman in February 1998, Oxford’s board voted to pay him a 
$9 million severance package.  
It can be inferred from the complete absence of public acrimony and accusations 
in the aftermath of such an enormous business setback that there were no major 
systems consultants retained by Oxford on this project.  Neither the Market Conduct 
Report nor Oxford’s 1997 Annual Report make any mention of management or 
systems consultants retained to assist in the development of the system.220  In 
contrast, the company’s independent accountants, KPMG, have received 
considerable adverse press for its failure to identify the problems with the system and 
Oxford’s financial position.  In both 1996 and 1997, KPMG approved Oxford’s 
books without qualification and made “no mention of the company’s billing and 
payment woes.”221  KPMG has been added as a defendant in a number of the lawsuits 
pending against Oxford.222  No other consultants have been named as defendants.  
The use of consultants at the least to assist in planning and oversight of the 
project might well have brought a degree of rigor, accountability and proven 
procedures to a project of this scale on which the board could have reasonably relied 
for assurance of sound systems development.  Given the apparent lack of software 
development experience among the Oxford staff, retention of experienced 
management consultants might fairly be viewed as a minimum requirement.   
The time pressures imposed on the system development process due to the 
growth in membership in 1996 could also have reasonably suggested to the board 
that professional consulting help was vital.  It is a common observation in the 
systems world that while one person can make a baby in nine months, it doesn’t 
follow that nine people can make a baby in one month.  Some things simply do take 
time to do well, especially adequate testing  which appears to have been lacking at 
Oxford.  With more experienced help, it is at least plausible that the board would 
have been better informed of the requirements of a sound development process, the 
system’s status and the company’s performance as measured against those standards 
and the risks involved in speeding up too fast.  Further, independent consultants 
might also have been more willing than insiders to alert senior management and the 
board to problems in the development process. 
As discussed above, an HMO’s information system is the source of information 
upon which much regulatory compliance depends.  As a publicly traded company, 
Oxford was subject to Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and NASDAQ 
requirements which call for timely disclosure of material facts regarding the 
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company’s financial condition.223  Oxford was also subject to many federal and state 
insurance regulations governing operations, reporting and reserves.  This additional 
burden on the information systems exposes the company to the risk of fines, 
suspension of trading or delisting by securities markets, exclusion from federal 
entitlement programs and being shut down by state insurance regulators.  These 
factors add significantly to the risk assumed when a company embarks alone to 
develop and implement major systems. 
Given every director’s duty to understand the fundamentals of the business,224 it 
may be reasonable to expect the board to have recognized the types of problems the 
HMO might encounter during and following the time of the system implementation.  
The board had to have known the plan was growing at a feverish pace, that the high 
demand groups of Medicaid and Medicare were targeted areas of growth, and that 
the plan was embarking on strategic product initiatives  all of which would put 
added demands on the information system. 
A widely used industry text, The Managed Health Care Handbook,225 devotes a 
chapter to common operational problems in managed health care plans. 226  Oxford, 
at the time of the system development and implementation, was clearly experiencing 
two of these problems: uncontrolled growth and systems inability to manage the 
business.227  It is a reasonable argument that these factors alone should have been 
sufficient to alert the board to a need for close attention to the systems project on 
which so much depended.  This attention is even more important, since the failure of 
any HMO’s systems is a root cause of many other common problems: inaccurate 
IBNR calculations, failure to reconcile accounts receivable and membership, and 
failure to track medical costs and utilization correctly.228  This trifecta of problems 
formed the core of the plan’s ultimate disaster.  
In light of such risks, reasonable directors could be expected to ensure that the 
systems project was managed carefully by fully accountable and competent staff, 
that the board was kept apprised of the significant design and development 
milestones, that the project plan specifically addressed the key areas of business and 
compliance risk, and that the board would receive regular, meaningful and 
documented performance reports.  In the absence of retained consultants, the board 
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would be expected to take additional steps to ensure that the staff with accountability 
for this project had the expertise to manage all the phases of the process.   
C.  Attention to Warning Signs of Trouble.  
Once a new system is implemented, the effective functioning of the system and 
the information which it brings to light regarding the operation of the business must 
be continually monitored.  For management and staff this monitoring is at a detailed 
level.  For the board, this role is carried out at a much greater remove.  Given this 
distance from the operational level, the board must rely on information from 
management.  The key questions for the board in this situation include: What are the 
proper types of information which the board should review?  What are the sources of 
this information?  How does the board assure itself of the reliability of the 
information and the one who provides it?  What are the indicators which the board 
should recognize as warning signs of potential problems?  
Financial statements from internal sources and independent accountants are a 
chief source of information for directors.  As noted above, Oxford’s independent 
accountants found no problems with the company’s systems prior to the Insurance 
Department investigation.229  In the absence of information to the contrary which 
would call into question the reliability of the accountant’s reports, management and 
directors could have reasonably relied on this information.  This being so, to the 
extent that the financial statements themselves showed red flags, Oxford’s board was 
clearly on notice of problems with business operations.  Three warnings were 
apparent from financial records as early as spring of 1997. 
The trend of the financial bottom line for the eighteen months prior to October, 
1997 was “picture perfect” with steadily rising profits and a constant medical loss 
ratio.230  But as is so often true, the devil is in the details.  Oxford’s quarterly 
statements showed unsettling changes in the company’s financial position.  Unpaid 
medical bills reached $625 million by late 1996 and remained “stubbornly high.”231  
Operating cash flow was negative starting in early 1997; it was to reach a nadir of 
negative $107.3 million.232  By the spring, premiums owed but uncollected - because 
accounts weren’t being billed  amounted to some forty percent of revenue; this 
amount had doubled in the six months since the new system was installed in 
September 1996.233  All of these problems stemmed directly from a system which 
couldn’t carry out basic functions: generating accurate bills, processing premiums, 
enrolling members and paying claims.  
Should these kinds of anomalies have prompted the Oxford board, or any board, 
to inquire further?  Were there other routine sources of information relating to the 
new system and operating performance available, such as might be generated by 
internal auditors?  Was a board committee, such as the Audit Committee, delegated 
responsibility to oversee the system development more closely than the full board?  
If so, did this committee set its own agenda and request reporting from the internal 
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auditors or from management so as to assure its members that the performance of the 
system met the board’s expectations?  
The Oxford board presumably had other sources of information which could 
reasonably have prompted further inquiry into the conditions and performance of the 
information systems. When the volume of complaints from providers over delayed 
claims prompted New York’s governor to order an investigation of the largest 
HMOs, it might have been reasonable for Oxford’s board to initiate an inquiry of its 
own into the causes of and planned remedies for the claims backlogs.  When the 
company began to issue lump-sum payments to providers as loans against future 
claims payment, an informed director, familiar with the fundamentals of the 
business, might have raised the question of the impact of the payments on the IBNR 
and required reporting.  Finally, after months of poor system performance, with no 
noticeable improvements, a reasonable director might at least inquire as to the value 
of an independent consultant’s assessment of the systems as a way to validate 
management’s continued assertions that the system is almost fixed.  Indeed this was 
one of the recommendations of Department to which Oxford belatedly agreed.  
D.  Application of the Gross Negligence Standard 
As discussed previously, the vast majority of courts will apply the gross 
negligence standard when determining whether a corporation’s board of directors 
met their duty of care.  As to a decision to build an in-house house information 
system, a court’s due care analysis will be guided by the business judgment rule.  
This rule gives rise to the presumption that, in the absence of fraud, self dealing or 
bad faith, directors are presumed to have reached a decision in good faith.234  
Specifically, a court will “look for evidence as to whether the board has acted in a 
deliberate and knowledgeable way in identifying and exploring alternatives.”235  The 
protective presumption can be rebutted where it can be shown that directors were not 
informed when making their decision in which case the directors may be found 
personally liable.  
Courts will view certain factors as particularly relevant in assessing whether 
directors were adequately informed.  These factors include extreme haste in the 
decisionmaking process where the circumstances of the decision do not indicate the 
need for speedy action; lack of board preparation as shown by the absence of, or 
inadequate time for the board to review in advance, meaningful and documented 
information supporting the reasons for and alternatives to the decision; and lack of 
questioning and involvement by the board to the extent that the board’s action 
appears to be mere acquiescence to management recommendations.236 
When reviewing the board’s attentiveness to and oversight of the information 
system development and implementation once the decision is made, courts will look 
to see whether directors have “exercise[d] a good faith effort to be informed and … 
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[have applied] appropriate judgment.237  Where directors are found to meet this 
standard, they will be “deemed to satisfy fully the duty of attention.” 238  
As a practical matter, conduct which fails to meet the measure of good faith must 
be egregious.  “Only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise 
oversight  such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information 
and reporting system exists  will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary 
condition to liability.”239  This standard is clearly “director-protective” in its 
qualifying language.240  Yet it also reflects the realistic limits on the ability of any 
board to assume operational responsibility for the ultimate success of the information 
system. 
To determine whether the Oxford board met its duty of care in the decision to 
build its information system and the manner in which the board oversaw the 
development and implementation of the system, a court would be expected to 
scrutinize the process utilized by the board, the types and quality of information 
available and used by management and board, as well as the degree of informed and 
independent judgment used by the individual directors.  Such an inquiry is wholly 
fact dependent and enormously detailed.  Until the litigation against the Oxford 
directors has progressed and this level of information is publicly available, any 
suggestion as to whether or not the directors failed in their duty of care is purely 
speculative.  However, the available information raises serious questions about the 
manner in which the board made this critical business decision.  
E.  Causation Analysis  
In the event that a board of directors would be found to have breached its duty of 
care in the context of the decision to build and oversight of information systems, 
there remains the hurdle of proving the board’s conduct was the proximate cause of 
the losses to the corporation.  
In the case of Oxford, causation could be particularly difficult prove because the 
company was not alone among HMOs in experiencing surprise losses in 1997.  
Managed care stocks as a whole dropped almost twelve percent that year.241  One 
rating service found that fifty-seven percent of the nation’s HMOs ended the year in 
the red.242  Industry leaders attributed the fall-off to rising medical costs and meager 
profit margins.243 
Kaiser Permanente suffered its first-ever losses in 1997, for at least two of the 
same reasons as Oxford: difficulty forecasting rising health care costs and faster 
membership growth than the plan could handle.244  As late as November, 1997 Kaiser 
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was projecting a loss of fifty million dollars;245 the actual loss for the year proved to 
be $270 million.  Aetna/U.S Healthcare, faced with care costs rising at fourteen 
percent, took a $160 million charge in the third quarter of 1997 for unanticipated 
medical expenses.246 
Like Oxford, a number of HMOs have found the Medicare HMO business a 
money loser.  Aetna/U.S. Healthcare in September, 1998 announced it was leaving 
the Medicare HMO markets in six states and the District of Columbia because the 
government reimbursement rates rendered the program unprofitable.247  Prudential 
HealthCare has done the same.248  
Against this backdrop of wide-spread industry losses and general failure to 
recognize the rising trend in medical costs, a court may have trouble tying Oxford’s 
losses and drop in stock price to either Oxford’s decision to build its own system or 
the board’s lack of oversight.  It might be argued that, had the system been 
functioning properly and providing prompt notice of cost trends, Oxford may have 
had the chance to change the cost trend through, e.g., targeted patient and provider 
education and increased attention to utilization review.  Yet, the company’s and the 
market’s circumstances in 1997 make it unlikely that Oxford could have effected a 
significant cost turnaround on short notice. 
The year long lock-in of premiums and time-consuming regulatory requirements 
for approval of rates would have prevented the company from raising prices 
promptly, the most effective means of countering higher costs.  Much of the growth 
in costs was attributable to the new Medicare and Medicaid populations who were 
generally less familiar, and likely less compliant, with HMO rules.  Although 
member education can be effective in reducing costs, it takes time for this effect to 
show up on the bottom line.  In addition, efficient access to Medicare members may 
be a problem.  An HMO can often utilize an employer’s benefits or human resources 
staff to communicate with group members.  Medicare members, in contrast, are 
individual enrollees, with no comparable intermediary through which the HMO can 
communicate efficiently.  Finally, the success of provider education will be at least 
somewhat dependent on the quality of the relationship between the HMO and the 
provider community.  Oxford had experienced claims payment problems under the 
old system; in addition, the company’s financial results had for many years been 
stellar.  Providers may not have been responsive to the company’s efforts to 
minimize its losses by changing provider behavior or reimbursement.  
Another factor in the causation analysis will be to separate out the specific effects 
of the information system from the general effects of the company’s operating losses.  
The first big drop in Oxford’s stock price occurred on the news that the plan was 
reporting its first ever quarterly loss.  On October 27, 1997, the full extent of 
Oxford’s systems disaster was not generally known.  This information became public 
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only later in 1997 and early 1998.  While the systems were clearly implicated in the 
loss position of the company, it is arguable that even if the systems had been perfect, 
Oxford’s first loss in eight years would still have sent the stock into a tailspin. 
Even if the Oxford board was found to have breached its duty of care in failing to 
heed the various financial warning signals in late 1996 and early 1997, this conduct 
would probably not stand up to the cause-in-fact analysis.  By the time the red flags 
should have been obvious to the board, in late 1996 and early 1997, the system was 
already in place and the damage largely done.  It is highly unlikely that the system 
could have been fixed fast enough to have avoided the operational and stock losses 
given the lagging nature of HMO costs and the lingering quality of bad projections.  
Oxford’s eventual decision to abandon its $100 million investment in the system and 
seek alternative solutions suggests that even if the board had recognized the 
problems in a timely manner and demanded an emergency effort to fix the system 
the problems were simply too great to overcome in time to avoid the financial losses.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
It will be some time before Oxford’s pending shareholder suits wend their way 
through the legal system and the details of the board’s decisions and actions become 
known.  As Delaware law will most likely govern the outcome, it is to be expected 
that the conduct of Oxford’s directors will not be found to have risen to the level of 
gross negligence.  No evidence of self-dealing or fraud by directors has been raised 
in the many media accounts or in the New York Insurance Department’s Market 
Conduct Report.  This leaves only the basis of lack of good faith on which to 
establish personal liability.  A court will have to find that the directors failed utterly 
even to attempt to assure that the information system was effective; the Caremark 
good faith standard is “quite high” indeed.249  Given that management and the 
independent accountants appeared to have confidence in the company’s financial 
statements up until October, 1997, the directors may find additional protection in 
their reasonable reliance on these documents as these statements, at the time, 
suggested that the system’s problems did not affect the bottom line.  
None of the parties to the pending shareholder litigation will be pleased with this 
outcome.  Such a conclusion will obviously disappoint the Oxford shareholders who 
bore enormous losses due, in large part, to the systems disaster.  The operating losses 
in 1997 and 1998 and the total waste of the investment in the failed system have 
deeply eroded the value of the company.  Although the cost of litigation will be 
borne by the company’s D&O insurance, Oxford will pay in the end, in higher 
insurance premiums.  
The directors themselves will find little solace in vindication.  They will pay a 
great personal price even in winning.  The legal process will examine every step in 
their decisionmaking and oversight over the period from 1993 through 1997.  While 
a court may spare the directors the extreme label of gross negligence, the public and 
the investment community will draw their own conclusions about the competence 
and attentiveness of Oxford’s directors.  The reputation of the individual directors 
will be tainted for a long time to come. 
The ultimate beneficiaries of Oxford’s downfall may well be the shareholders 
and directors of other HMOs and health insurers for whom Oxford’s experience will 
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serve as a cautionary tale.  For those companies embarking on major information 
systems initiatives in the future, the lessons from Oxford should result in far greater 
rigor in decisionmaking than appears to have occurred in Oxford’s boardroom.  It is 
to be hoped that other directors will recognize the need for competence, 
sophistication and pragmatism so that they can better meet their duty of attention in 
oversight of information systems.  This is as it should be, given the strategic 
importance of information systems in HMOs and health insurance today. 
The business and compliance pressures facing HMOs are enormous: the intensely 
competitive environment, the rapid rate of change within the industry, the constant 
tension between enhancing choice while reducing costs and the ever growing 
complexity of state and federal government requirements.  Not one of these 
challenges can be met without effective information systems.  It is a question of 
survival, let alone success.  The best interests of the HMO corporation require an 
information system which can carry out its crucial business functions.  This business 
imperative, if not the legal imperative, requires more of a director than merely the 
absence of bad faith to meet her duty of care in oversight of the HMO’s information 
systems. 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the legal and strategic issues raised by the use of 
information systems in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other 
managed care organizations.  Given the critical nature of information systems to an 
HMO’s business success and regulatory compliance, the large financial investment 
HOMs make in their systems, and the widely publicized concerns over the year 2000 
“millenium bug” problem, information systems are appropriately a matter of concern 
to an HMO’s board of directors. 
The recent experience of Oxford Health Plans, Inc. offers a case study in the 
apparent failure of the directors to monitor adequately the in-house development of 
an information system.  The systems disaster which this corporation suffered in 1997 
led to a dramatic drop in stock price, from which the company has yet to recover, as 
well as intense scrutiny by state and federal regulators and countless shareholder 
derivative actions against the directors. 
Corporate directors are subject to the fiduciary duty of care.  Despite statutes in 
some states requiring directors to act prudently, state courts almost always apply the 
standard of gross negligence.  As a result, even when directors act without due 
deliberation in their decision, it is rare that a court will find them to have failed in 
their duty of care.  The business and regulatory community may find otherwise, 
however, when directors fail to evaluate information systems options carefully and 
the business suffers as a result. 
 
